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27.07.2017 14:31 Alter: 115 days

Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory

Call for Publications

Theme: Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory
Publication: Feminist Philosophy Quarterly
Date: Special Issue
Deadline: 31.12.2017

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly seeks submissions for a special issue
on Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory. An important
development in contemporary Anglo-American feminist epistemology has
been the concept of epistemic injustice, which, as articulated for
example by Miranda Fricker, has emerged out of and re-invigorated a
rich line of work in feminist epistemology on epistemic exclusion,
silencing, subordination, and motivated ignorance, including work by
Linda Alcoff, Kristie Dotson, José Medina, and Charles Mills. Another
important development in moral and political philosophy, especially
in the Continental tradition, has been the philosophy of recognition.
Recognition theory has roots in the work of Beauvoir and Fanon,
although its most influential recent articulation has been by Axel
Honneth, with debates about recognition and inclusion taken forward
in feminist contexts by Iris Marion Young and Nancy Fraser amongst

While there are many virtues to the literature on epistemic
injustice, epistemic exclusion, and silencing, current analysis and
critique of these forms of injustice can potentially be improved and
enriched by bringing recognition theory into the conversation.
Recognition theory on the one hand, and contemporary epistemological
work informed by feminism and critical race theory on the other, have
developed largely separately from one another. Yet these fields of
discussion have considerable bearing on one another. From a
recognition theory perspective, the failure properly to recognise and
afford somebody or a social group the epistemic respect they merit
might be conceived as an act of recognition injustice. Perhaps part
of the harm of epistemic injustice, exclusion, and silencing, then,
is that of robbing a group or individual of their status as rational
enquirer in a conversation, and so creating an asymmetrical cognitive

The aim of this special issue is to open a dialogue between
discussions of epistemic injustice and in recognition theory.

We invite contributing authors to consider how far these developments
can and should inform and enrich one another. Questions that might be
considered include the following, indicatively. Do relations of
misrecognition underpin processes of epistemic exclusion and
silencing, or do the latter instead underpin the former; or are the
two mutually supporting? How well can different types of epistemic
injustice—e.g., testimonial and hermeneutical—be understood as types
of recognition injustice? What light can analyses of epistemic and
recognition injustice shed on one another? What limitations do we
discover in either or both types of analysis when we put them into
conversation? What new questions and problems open up as a result of
bringing these two fields of debate into conversation?

We are looking for papers that explore advantages of and/or
difficulties with bringing thought on epistemic injustice and
recognition together. We expect contributors to engage with existing
feminist work in both strands of thought, including work by feminist
philosophers of colour and critical race theorists.

Papers should be 9000 words maximum, exclusive of references,
prepared for anonymous review with a separate cover page, and
accompanied by an abstract of no more than 200 words.

The submission deadline is 31 December 2017.

Guest Editors:
Paul Giladi (University College Dublin), Nicola McMillan (Lancaster
University), and Alison Stone (Lancaster University).

José Medina, Danielle Petherbridge, Matt Congdon, Rebecca Tsosie, and
Miranda Fricker (afterword) are confirmed contributors.

Please feel free to contact any of the guest editors in advance of
submission: paul.giladi(at); n.mcmillan(at);

Final submissions should be made electronically to the address: